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ORIGINAL PAPER
Civil Society and Its Institutional Context in CEE
Michael Meyer1 • Clara Moder2 • Michaela Neumayr1 • Peter Vandor1
 The Author(s) 2019
Abstract Although civil societies in Central and Eastern
Europe are often portrayed as similar, united by a shared
communist past, they have developed along increasingly
divergent trajectories over the past three decades. This
article investigates the current state of civil society in the
region and the role the institutional context plays in it.
Drawing on historical institutionalism and the process of
European integration, we classify the 14 countries under
investigation into three distinct groups and analyze data
from a survey of more than 350 local civil society experts.
We find that, together with domestic governments, inter-
national donors and the EU are perceived as the most
influential institutional actors for civil society organiza-
tions. Their respective influences, however, depend largely
on a country’s stage in the EU accession process. Overall,
the study provides a differentiated mapping of civil society
in this region and a better understanding of how the insti-
tutional context relates to a country’s civil society.
Keywords Civil society  Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE)  Historical institutionalism  Institutional context 
European integration
Introduction
Over the last three decades, civil society in Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE) has developed with unprecedented
dynamism. While it has experienced strong growth
throughout the region, with the number of civil society
organizations (CSOs) increasing sharply, the trajectories
and roles of the different civil societies (CS) have varied
significantly since the collapse of communist regimes
(Ekiert and Kubik 2014; Vandor et al. 2017).1 In Hungary,
for instance, independent CSOs face discrimination and
persecution by the government (Kuti 2017), whereas in
some countries they have become important partners of the
public sector by advocating for social services (Do-
maradzka 2018; Jezierska and Polanska 2018; Piotrowski
2015) or delivering them (Navra´til and Pecjal 2017). In
others again, parts of CS are strongly supported by inter-
national actors, yet under suspicion of being detached from
citizens (Spahic´-Sˇiljak 2017).
Despite the large number of studies investigating the
state of CS in individual CEE countries, there has been
little comparative research offering a contemporary per-
spective on the role of CS across the region (Salamon et al.
2004; Toepler and Salamon 2003), and even less work that
tries to understand the divergent developments. Indeed, we
still find rather homogenous depictions of CS across CEE
& Peter Vandor
Peter.Vandor@wu.ac.at
Michael Meyer
Michael.Meyer@wu.ac.at
Clara Moder
clara.moder@univie.ac.at
Michaela Neumayr
Michaela.Neumayr@wu.ac.at
1 Wirtschaftsuniversita¨t Wien, Vienna, Austria
2 University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
1 While the concept of CSO includes any private, self-governing, and
institutionalized organization that does not distribute profit to its
owners and involves some form of voluntary participation (Salamon
and Anheier 1998, p. 216), the concept of CS is much broader. It is
defined as the arena outside the state, the market and the family where
people associate to advance common interest (Heinrich 2007). In this
arena, collective action in CSOs and also through other, less
institutionalized forms of engagement take place (e.g., demonstra-
tions, social movements, boycotts) (Heinrich 2005, p. 213).
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in existing scholarly work, which emphasizes shared past
experiences, specifically the legacy of totalitarian com-
munist regimes and the unprecedented political and eco-
nomic transformations experienced by societies in the
region (Howard 2002, 2003; Kendall et al. 2000; Lauth
2017; Rikmann and Keedus 2013; Toepler and Salamon
2003). In contrast, the influence of more recent historical
events and of the institutional context in individual coun-
tries has received hardly any attention (for an exception see
Aksartova 2009), and comparative research on the role of
institutional contexts is completely lacking.
Our study seeks to fill this gap by exploring the influence
of institutional context on CSOs in 14 CEE countries,2
taking account of their different paths toward Euoprean
Union (EU) membership since 1989. Specifically, we try to
answer two questions. First, how do local civil society
experts perceive the influence of the institutional context and
its actors (e.g., central government, foreign donor institu-
tions, the European Union) in shaping civil society? And,
second, how do these expert assessments differ between
groups of countries that have reached similar stages in the
process of moving toward EU membership and beyond?
So far, research on CS’s institutional context has typi-
cally built on the social origins theory (SOT) (cf. Salamon
and Anheier 1998). Though this approach has been useful
for Western societies, it is less applicable to other countries
(Kabalo 2013). Therefore, our study takes a different one.
Drawing on historical institutionalism, we reflect on the
process of EU accession as a critical juncture for each of
the 14 countries (Vandor et al. 2017). Additionally, we
explore data from a survey conducted in these states,
including the assessments of more than 350 experts
regarding the influence on CS of the institutional context
and key actors within it, and of how that context relates to
recent developments in CS in their countries.
Thus, we aim to go beyond existing research in four
ways. First, we seek to offer a contemporary perspective on
CS in CEE. Second, following Rikmann and Keedus
(2013), we peek ‘‘behind the fac¸ade of the relative homo-
geneity’’ of civil society in CEE and divide our 14 coun-
tries into three groups on the basis of their paths toward EU
membership. Third, our study is the first to represent a
comprehensive analysis of the institutional context of CS in
CEE. Finally, we aim to contribute to third sector research
by expanding on social origins theory and acknowledging
the important role of foreign institutional forces for CSOs.
We begin by discussing historical institutionalism and
social origins theory, arguing that both the role of foreign
actors and the insights of scholars of European integration
should be taken more explicitly into account. We then
cluster the 14 countries into three groups according to their
rate of progress toward EU membership. Then, after
describing our survey data and methodology, we analyze
the perceived influence of various institutional actors in
each of the three country groups and discuss how these
actors relate to the role and activities of CSOs. We con-
clude with a discussion of our main findings, their impli-
cations for research and their limitations.
Theoretical Framework and Research Review
Scholars have long been analyzing institutions and their
impact on societies (Kendall et al. 2000; Kitschelt 1992;
Skocpol and Somers 1980). This approach, institutional-
ism, has proven to be powerful in explaining complex
phenomena (Boli and Thomas 1997; Drori et al. 2006;
Thelen 1999), including global variations in the role of
civil society. In accordance with the literature (March and
Olsen 1984; Peters 2011), we understand institutions as
societal structures that are based on both formal rules (e.g.,
legal frameworks) and informal ones (e.g., those deriving
from a set of shared norms). Both types evolve slowly over
long periods of time and guide and constrain the behavior
of individual and organizational actors alike. Analyzing
institutions thus implies identifying how they construct
agency and which forces shape them (Meyer et al. 1987;
Ruef and Scott 1998; Scharpf 1997; Scott 2000; Scott and
Meyer 1994; Tolbert 1985). As regards societies’ institu-
tional context, institutional forces are exerted mainly by
collective actors, which include formally organized actors
typically structured by (top-down) rules (Scharpf 1997),
e.g., governments, foundations or churches.
Historical institutionalism, which focuses on the genesis
and history of institutions and their consequences in the
present, suggests that political and societal outcomes are
conditioned both by path dependency and by critical
junctures in time. Empirically, historical institutionalists
focus on the qualitative analysis of case studies of nations
and regions in order to gain insights into the evolution of
societal institutions and outcomes (Kerlin 2013). Since
institutional change is caused not only by transitions from
one system to another, but also by the interaction, re-ar-
rangement and re-combination of different institutions
(Schmidt 2010; Scott 2000; Smets et al. 2012; Thelen
1999), historical institutionalism provides a useful theo-
retical perspective in explaining the emergence and per-
sistence of institutions that facilitate collective action (Tilly
1984).
Historical institutionalism also provides scholars with
insights about transition and post-communist patterns of
democratization, societal development and civil society
activity (Merkel 2010). Civil society activity has been
2 All those that did not form part of the Soviet Union prior to 1989.
The Baltic States, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus are therefore not
included.
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related to two different types of historical legacy, the first
being that of communism. On this view, the comparatively
low levels of participation in CSOs in post-communist
countries are explained by such factors as forced mem-
bership in organizations and the resultant highly politicized
public sphere. This has led to the notion that post-com-
munist civil societies are relatively ‘‘weak’’ (Howard 2002;
Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2013).
Secondly, through their social orginis theory (which
builds on the work of Moore, 1966, and Esping-Andersen
1990), Salamon and Anheier (1998), explain third sector
patterns in different countries by past political and eco-
nomic struggles. They assume that, like the emergence of
democracy or a welfare state, the third sector’s role in a
particular country has been determined by the balance of
power between the urban middle class, a rural peasantry,
landed elites and the state (Salamon and Anheier 1998,
p. 227; Smith and Grønbjerg 2006). To describe that role,
they locate countries on each of two dimensions: level of
government spending and third sector size (in employment
terms). The resulting grid enables countries to be catego-
rized into one of four so-called nonprofit regimes: statist,
liberal, social democratic and corporatist. While the
framework gives most weight to the state, it nevertheless
reflects ‘‘a particular constellation of social forces’’ (Sala-
mon et al. 2000). SOT has been criticized for various
reasons (e.g., Ragin 1998; Steinberg and Young 1998): the
aggregate conception of the third sector, which makes it
impossible to account for its heterogeneity; the limited
attention to nonlinear relationships; and the over-emphasis
on social service provision. Yet its achievement in ren-
dering third sectors both visible and comparable is widely
acknowledged, and it has been widely applied in order to
map, analyze and categorize third sectors in different
countries (Salamon et al. 2004; Toepler and Salamon
2003).
However, while SOT remains a helpful framework for
analyzing and clustering ‘‘Western’’ third sectors, it has
been less helpful for post-transition countries. As Salamon
et al. themselves note, ‘‘the Eastern European countries in
our sample represent an interesting mix of the statist and
social-democratic tendencies’’ (2000, p. 20). At the same
time, they acknowledge that patterns of government
spending on social policy and on CSOs in formerly com-
munist countries are hardly comparable to Western ones.
Some critics have gone further; Ekiert and Foa (2011), for
example, challenge the very notion of ‘‘post-communist
civil society.’’ Other research on transition countries has
pointed to a need to include factors beyond state-nonprofit
relations in explanatory models. In her analysis of Israel
and Palestine, Kabalo (2013) found that a systemic change
from foreign to domestic influence has altered relations
between the state and the nonprofit sector and concluded
that diaspora movements are important influences on civil
society.3
In CEE, it is clear that CSs have been heavily influenced
by foreign institutions (Ottaway and Carothers 2000),
especially by the European Union. Scholars of European
integration have analyzed the EU’s role as a foreign actor,
building domestic institutions and funding CSOs in order to
nurture CS and so promote democracy (Beichelt et al.
2014). Most of them focus on formal institutions and
government behavior, establishing the notion of EU con-
ditionality—the idea that a country is more likely to align
its legislation with EU directives if it has a realistic pro-
spect of accession (Bo¨rzel and Risse 2005; Schimmelfen-
nig and Sedelmeier 2004)—and pointing to a decline in EU
influence after accession (Ganev 2013; Sedelmeier 2017).
Those investigating CS emphasize CSOs’ strategies to
exploit political opportunity structures and mobilize
resources in the light of possible EU membership (Bu-
zoga´ny 2011; Wunsch 2016), their success in holding
governments to account (Dimitrova and Buzoga´ny 2014) or
their involvement in policy- and decision-making (Bo¨rzel
and Buzoga´ny 2010). Fewer studies investigate the impact
of the EU and other foreign forces on CS, and those that do
find that this influence has been highly contradictory (Fa-
gan 2006; Kutter and Trappmann 2010) and difficult to
gauge (Shapovalova and Youngs 2014). Whereas the EU
has brought benefits for larger CSOs, it may actually have
hindered the emergence of grassroots movements or the
establishment of sustainable income sources (Bo¨rzel 2010).
Here, it is important to note that the EU has not always
been active in CS funding. Prior to the Eastern enlargement
of 2004–2007, it focused on technical assistance and leg-
islative advice, leaving CSO funding largely to foundations
and donor institutions such as the CEE Trust, Mott Foun-
dation or the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) (Fagan 2006). Only following
establishment of the Eastern Partnership Program did CS
become a more explicit element of both European neigh-
borhood policy and membership negotiations (Shapovalova
and Youngs 2014). Nevertheless, potential and actual
European membership and EU-led programs have had an
enormous impact on the institutional context in which
CSOs operate, especially on legislation and state-civil
society relations (Fagan and Wunsch 2018; Kutter and
Trappmann 2010). Thus, these relations depend not only on
government spending (cf. Kamera¯de et al. 2016) and
domestic institutions, but also on other factors neglected by
SOT.
3 This criticism mirrors the earlier debate on Moore’s (1966) work on
social origins of modernization in various societies. As Skocpol
(1973, p. 12) notes, a ‘‘theoretical focus on exclusively intrasocietal
change-producing processes’’ is too narrow because ‘‘no society is
free from foreign influences’’ (1973, p. 29).
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In this study, we therefore deviate from social origins
theory and focus on domestic and foreign institutional
forces, particularly the EU. We emphasize especially how
CS experts in our 14 countries perceive the degree of
influence these forces exert on civil society. We assume
that the EU’s influence diminishes as a country has
received membership. With regard to the influence of other
institutional forces, we formulate no assumptions and take
an explorative approach. We also seek to explore what the
countries of the region have in common in terms of their
recent development.
Grouping Countries by Their Stage in the Process
of EU Accession
The fact that all countries in CEE share a communist past
scarcely explains the diverse paths that they have taken.
Indeed, it is obvious how vastly different the outcomes of
the democratic transitions have been. We argue that the
most significant factor in accounting for current differences
in the state of CSs is the role of the European Union in
setting the institutional context. We therefore classify the
14 countries under investigation into three distinct groups
according to the stage they have reached in the process of
EU accession.
The first group comprises the Visegra´d countries (Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) and Slovenia.
These five countries were in the vanguard when it came to
liberalizing the economy and democratizing politics. All of
them progressed rapidly toward membership during the
1990s and were part of the first EU Eastern enlargement in
2004 (Sedelmeier 2014).
The countries of the second group joined the EU some
years later: Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, Croatia in
2013. In the cases of Bulgaria and Romania, EU accession
was postponed from 2004 as they continued to struggle
against persistent corruption and in implementing the
reforms necessary to meet the Copenhagen criteria
(Noutcheva and Bechev 2008). This experience led the EU
to impose stricter accession criteria on Croatia. Along with
the economic crisis of 2008 and Slovenia’s lengthy
blockade of negotiations, this meant that the country only
became the 28th EU member state in July 2013 (Titanski-
Hooper 2015).
Finally, the remaining six countries have not yet joined
European Union and have differing prospects of future
accession. Albania, Republic of North Macedonia, Mon-
tenegro and Serbia have already obtained candidate status
(albeit negotiations have started only with Serbia and
Montenegro), whereas Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Kosovo are currently listed as potential candidates. The
former’s application for candidate status is currently under
investigation, while Kosovo’s situation is complicated by
the fact that some existing member states do not
acknowledge its independence from Serbia, which it
declared in 2008 (European Commission 2016).
Apart from having progressed similarly toward EU
accession, the countries within each of the three groups
are also similar in economic terms, as can be seen from
Table 1, which shows key indicators for all the countries
included in our study. For example, GDP per capita
expressed in Purchasing Power Standards is considerably
higher in Group 1 countries than in those making up
Group 2 and more than double that of countries in Group
3. Similarly, the country groups differ with respect to the
share of employees active in CSOs (averages per group:
1.8%, 1.2% and 0.8%), to the number of CSOs per 1000
citizens (averages per group: 7.4, 5.3 and 2.7), and to the
level of informal forms of civic engagement.
Data and Methodology
Our explorative study builds on two types of sources. First,
it is based on the literature and policy reports about CS in
the region, including country-specific (e.g., Parau 2009)
and conceptual work (Bo¨rzel 2010; Ekiert and Kubik 2014;
Kutter and Trappmann 2010), as well as on recent com-
parative studies on CS in CEE (Rikmann and Keedus
2013; Vandor et al. 2017). Second, our analysis draws on
data we collected using a survey of CS experts in our 14
countries. The countries had been selected to include all
former independent Socialist countries or their successor
states within the region. The survey was designed as an
expert survey (Bogner et al. 2009; Meuser and Nagel
2009). This was deemed an appropriate approach given the
sensitivity of the questions, as well as the difficulty of
gaining access to other comparative data sources (see Ray
1999). In expert surveys, data are gathered from respon-
dents with practical insider knowledge, who serve as
‘‘crystallization points’’ and surrogates for the knowledge
of a wider circle of players (Bogner et al. 2009). Findings
are thus not representative of the general population but of
a subset of individuals knowledgeable in a specific field—
in our case, CS in their respective countries (Bogner and
Menz 2009).
The main criterion according to which the local experts
were selected for interview was professional experience in
CS practice or research, this being the type of expertise
most relevant for providing insight into the research
question (Bogner and Menz 2009). Respondents were
identified using a snowball sampling approach (Coleman
1958), which is particularly appropriate for populations in
which insider knowledge is required to identify experts and
for especially sensitive topics (Biernacki and Waldorf
Voluntas
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1981).4 Our snowball sampling started from multiple
points located in research organizations in each of the
selected countries and proceeded through the networks of
two foundations active in the region as funders of social,
cultural and journalistic causes, as well as research. Each
respondent was invited to forward the survey to further
experts in the field.
The survey was conducted anonymously, online and in
English between February 9 and March 16, 2016. In total,
361 experts responded to it. The number of experts per
country ranged from 11 in Poland to 36 in Hungary. Both
the total sample size and the sample size per country can be
deemed acceptable by comparison with similar multi-
country expert surveys (Ray 1999; USAID 2018). More
importantly, experts reported an average of 14.5 years of
professional or academic experience in civil society and
80.6% stated that they were founders or directors of a CSO
(see Table 2).
The goal of the survey was to elicit experts’ assessments
of the role and perceived influence of institutional forces on
CS in their respective countries. In our questionnaire, we
presented a list of institutional actors derived from litera-
ture (e.g., Kamera¯de et al. 2016; Reljic and und Sicherheit
2004; Salamon and Anheier 1998; Taylor 2000). This list
was then confirmed and amended in a pre-study focus
group comprising 25 members of CSOs from the region.
The final list included nine types of actors relevant for civil
society: (1) domestic central (federal) government, (2)
domestic regional government, (3) domestic municipal
(local) government, (4) the European Union, (5) corpora-
tions, (6) media, (7) private philanthropists, (8) foreign
(private and public) donor institutions (such as foundations
or USAID), and (9) churches and religious institutions. For
each institutional actor, respondents were asked to assess
its degree of influence on CS in the country concerned (on
a Likert-type scale ranging from ‘‘1 = no influence’’ to
‘‘6 = very strong influence’’) and to indicate whether they
considered this influence positive (= 1), mixed (= 0), or
negative (= - 1) for CS.5 To assure the quality of
responses, participants were permitted to omit assessment
of certain actors if felt they lacked adequate information.
Table 1 CSOs and civil society in CEE: key indicators. Sources: BCSDN 2015, European Value Survey 2008 (weighted values), Eurostat 2016a
and 2016b, World Bank 2016 (reference year: 2015)
Population
(millions)
Annual
GDP
growth (%)
GDP per capita in PPS
(Index, EU28 = 100)
CSO value
added as
% of GDP
Share of
employment
in CSOs (%)
Active
CSOs
per 1000
capita
Volunteer
engagement
(%)
Czech Republic 10.50 4.20 85 1.77 2.09 12.13 26.8
Hungary 9.87 2.94 68 1.55 3.70 6.47 12.2
Poland 38.50 3.65 69 1.40 0.90 2.08 8.5
Slovakia 5.40 3.60 77 0.98 1.45 9.70 13.5
Slovenia 2.06 2.88 83 2.06 1.02 13.90 32.1
Group 1: Sums and Averages 66.33 3.45 76 1.55 1.83 8.86 16.9
Bulgaria 7.60 2.97 46 n/a 0.60 1.25 11.9
Croatia 4.30 1.64 58 n/a 1.56 13.70 n.a.
Romania 20.00 3.74 57 0.60 1.20 1.30 13.2
Group 2: Sums and Averages 31.90 2.78 54 0.60 1.12 5.42 12.6
Albania 2.80 2.56 30 0.28 0.72 0.87 19.7
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.80 3.16 29 0.60 0.38 1.71 8.3
Kosovo 1.80 3.62 n/a n/a 2.58 4.44 10.4
North Macedonia 2.07 3.67 37 0.96 0.38 2.00 n.a.
Montenegro 0.62 3.37 41 0.58 0.37 1.69 7.5
Serbia 7.20 0.73 36 1.34 0.34 5.20 11.2
Group 3: Sums and Averages 18.29 2.85 35 0.75 0.80 2.65 11.4
Total 116.5 3.1 55 1.10 1.24 5.46 13.6
4 Given the recent criticism of, and attacks on CS by public officials
and the media in some CEE countries, we deemed the topic to be
sensitive.
5 The exact questions posed were: ‘‘How influential are the following
actors of the institutional environment of civil society in your
country? How positive or negative is their influence on the
development of civil society in scale and scope?’’
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Of the 361 respondents, 283 provided at least one rating for
the perceived influence of actors. All the ratings were
included in our analysis.
Since ‘influence’ is an ambiguous concept and can be
exerted on various levels and through multiple channels, its
measurement is extremely challenging. However, assessing
‘perceived’ and ‘attributed influence’ has proven to be a
useful approach to capturing its various forms (Baranowski
and Gross 2006; Du¨r 2008). Checking for reliability, we
computed Krippendorff’s alpha values for the assessments
of the degree and direction of actors’ perceived influence
on CS; these ranged from 0.73 in Romania to 0.85 in
Bulgaria. Considering the complexity of the question, this
can be regarded as an acceptable level of inter-rater relia-
bility (Krippendorff 2004).
In analyzing these quantitative data, we first calculated
the country means of ratings given for the degree and the
direction of perceived influence exercised by the nine
specified institutional actors. These means were then
aggregated per country and presented to 21 civil society
researchers in the country concerned, who provided in-
depth written interpretations of these numerical results in
their country contexts (Vandor et al. 2017). Finally, we
aggregated the ratings for the countries within each group
to give a group rating, all countries being weighted equally,
and conducted ANOVA with post hoc tests to capture
mean differences. The aggregated expert ratings and their
interpretations by local researchers [see Vandor et al.
(2017), and various subchapters, e.g., Kuti (2017) or
Smilova (2017)], combined with country-specific compar-
ative and conceptual studies of the region, formed the main
body of evidence for our study.
The online survey also contained an exploratory open
question concerned with ongoing and future trends in CS in
the various countries. Respondents were asked to identify
and describe the developments they were expecting in their
own country over the next 10–15 years.6 The purpose of
this question was to induce participants to reflect on
institutional context factors and their likely influence on
CS. Such future-oriented framings motivate the analysis of
deep structures and underlying problems rather than sur-
face-level information (Klayman and Schoemaker 1993).
Respondents were thus invited not only to describe their
knowledge about the current institutional context (e.g., of
current challenges), but also to organize this knowledge for
predictive purposes.
After eliminating incomplete answers, we ended up with
496 descriptions of expected developments contributed by
179 different experts. These texts were content-analyzed by
two independent raters, in two rounds. In the first, each
description was coded inductively (Mayring 2010; Stemler
2001). Comparison and discussion of their coding led to 55
different categories. Examples are:
• social entrepreneurship (typical quote: ‘‘The past
15 years have seen a proliferation of new CSOs […].
This is likely to continue. Given the plethora of
trainings on financial sustainability.’’)
Table 2 Sample characteristics by country
Country Respondent characteristics
Sample size Years of work experience (average) Co-founder or director of CSO (%)
Albania 25 14.12 60.0
Bosnia and Herzegovina 30 16.30 83.3
Bulgaria 17 14.82 88.2
Croatia 33 12.88 75.6
Czech Republic 23 12.00 82.6
Hungary 36 20.69 83.3
Kosovo 14 8.36 85.7
Montenegro 25 14.64 100.0
Poland 11 20.82 45.4
Republic of North Macedonia 31 12.94 96.8
Romania 32 11.50 78.1
Serbia 30 10.50 86.6
Slovak Republic 28 13.21 78.6
Slovenia 26 20.19 65.3
6 Full question: ‘‘What is your best guess: Which will be the major
trends in civil society over the next 10–15 years? What will be the
implications of these trends for the civil society itself? […]. You can
refer to specific trends in civil society (e.g., changing influence of
government on civil society, change in private donations) or general
trends in society that will have strong implications for civil society
(e.g., demographic change and its implications for care-giving).’’
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• increased government control (typical quote: ‘‘It can be
expected that government will be making much greater
pressure on civil society at least in Bosnia and
Herzegovina to be able to control it, both through laws
and establishing GONGOs.’’)
In the second round, we selected those categories
referring directly to our nine institutional actors, of which
there were 22 (e.g., for the actor government, decreasing
public funding: for the actor church, increasing influence of
the church: see also Table 4). The results of this qualitative
content analysis were used to provide quotes illustrative of
the perceived influence of individual actors.
Findings: The Role of Civil Societies’ Institutional
Context in CEE
Our data, both qualitative and quantitative, reveal consid-
erable differences between the country groups as regards
the perceived influence on civil society of the various
institutional actors, the roles of domestic government and
foreign institutions being seen as particularly decisive.
After reporting on these inter-group differences, we will
take a closer look at the role of the institutional context in
each of the three country groups in turn.
Differences in Civil Societies’ Institutional Context
Across all countries, domestic government and foreign
institutions were consistently identified as the most influ-
ential institutional actors in shaping civil society (for a
summary of our quantitative data, including ANOVA post
hoc test results, see Table 3). Our experts gave their
highest ratings on the 6-point scale to central government
(mean = 4.61, SD = 1.37), the European Union (mean =
4.31, SD = 1.30), and foreign donors (mean = 4.25;
SD = 1.32). At the other end of the spectrum, corporations
(mean = 2.82, SD = 1.27) and private philanthropists
(mean = 2.79, SD = 1.31) were perceived as least influ-
ential on civil societies in the region.
Nevertheless, there are substantial inter-group differ-
ences with regard to the mean ratings awarded to
domestic government and foreign actors. In the Visegra´d
countries and Slovenia (Group 1), domestic institutional
actors are perceived as most influential. This is not sur-
prising, given that these countries, despite some recent
setbacks and with the exception of Hungary, are regarded
as largely consolidated democracies (Freedom House
2018). Most foreign donor institutions, which were often
Western organizations, withdrew from these countries
during the process of EU accession formally completed in
May 2004. As membership of the EU implies that
European funds are managed and distributed by local
authorities, these have increased in relative importance. In
the countries of the Western Balkans (Group 3), by
contrast, foreign actors are seen as most influential. As
these countries are at a rather early stage in the accession
process, they are striving to adapt to the EU’s legal
frameworks in order to meet its requirements. Further-
more, some of the Western Balkan countries are still
considered post-conflict states, which implies a continuing
strong presence of foreign organizations aimed at conflict
resolution and peace-keeping. Finally, the data for Bul-
garia, Croatia and Romania, the countries forming Group
2, present a mixed picture. Both foreign and domestic
institutional forces are considered as influential, hinting at
a transitional stage. The legacy of the EU accession
process is still visible in the institutional context, but
domestic institutions are slowly emerging as significant
players.
Our qualitative data substantiate and enrich these find-
ings on the differences regarding CSOs’ institutional con-
text (see Table 4). While some of the expected trends
described in them are common to all country groups (e.g.,
increase in private donations, more collaboration with
companies), many others are not (e.g., rise in governmental
illiberalism, increase in donor dependence). This is addi-
tional evidence that the three groups differ in the makeup
of their institutional contexts. It also provides illustrations
that allow us to better understand experts’ perception of
actors’ influence as positive or negative, as well as
impulses for deeper analysis in the following subsections.
Government-Dominated Context in the Visegra´d
Countries and Slovenia
In this first group of countries, the influence of the EU is
perceived as moderate, comparable to the influence of local
and regional governments, while most other institutional
actors are assessed as having a moderate to low level of
influence (see Fig. 1). In all cases, the most influential
institutional player is the respective central government.
This may be because central governments not only provide
essential funding for CSOs, but also create the legal
framework in which they operate and influence the political
and public environment (Fink-Hafner and Novak 2017;
Kuti 2017; Szabo´ and Ma´rkus 2014). However, the direc-
tion of their influence is assessed divergently. In the Czech
Republic, Poland and Slovenia no clear picture emerges,
whereas the majority of Hungarian and Slovakian experts
regard it negatively. Taking into account recent develop-
ments in the Visegra´d countries and Slovenia, these per-
ceptions may even have worsened since we collected our
data. In particular, two factors may serve as explanations:
the increasing control exerted over CSOs by increasingly
authoritarian or ‘‘illiberal’’ governments and the resulting
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polarization of (civil) society (Ekiert et al. 2017b). Given
the recent political developments in the countries of Group
1, the experts surveyed suggest that these trends are likely
to continue.
As Greskovits (2015) has noted, the influence of par-
ties and government on CSOs in this group of countries
has greatly increased. Particularly in Hungary, and more
recently in Poland, such interventions have reduced the
independence of CSOs and their ability to criticize public
authorities, which in turn has been fueling public distrust
of civil society. Generally, a hostile attitude toward CSOs
can be observed, leading to incidents such as the blockade
of European Economic Area (EEA) grants in Hungary, or
the termination of state funding for women’s CSOs in
Poland. One Hungarian respondent notes ‘‘continuing
efforts by a corrupt regime to dominate and control all
forms of social opposition, including […] civil society
organizations.’’7
At the same time, governments have established orga-
nizations to pursue their political agendas, thus deliberately
furthering the process of polarization of (civil) society
along ideological lines. Although, up to now, this devel-
opment has mostly affected organizations active in the
fields of advocacy and policy work, the general trend is
much broader. Furthermore, polarization is likely to spread
into other parts of society, causing tensions and reducing
public trust in CS (Ekiert et al. 2017a). According to one
Polish respondent, ‘‘polarization will reflect the general
division in Polish political culture between a nationalist-
Table 3 Perceived influence of institutional actors (degree and direction) by country groups
Group means Post hoc means comparison (Tukey test 1)
All 14
countries
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 D (Group 1–
Group 2)
D (Group 1–
Group 3)
D (Group 2–
Group 3)(CZ, HU, PL,
SK, SI)
(BG,
HR, RO)
(AL, BiH, NMK,
MNE, SRB, XK)
Perceived influence of
central government
4.61 4.97 4.45 4.38 p\ 0.05 p\ 0.01 n.s.
Direction of influence - 0.25 - 0.31 - 0.06 - 0.30 p\ 0.05 n.s. p\ 0.05
Perceived influence of
regional government
3.32 3.48 3.14 3.31 n.s. n.s. n.s.
Direction of influence - 0.04 0.03 - 0.09 - 0.07 n.s. n.s. n.s.
Perceived influence of
municipal government
3.80 3.93 3.97 3.59 n.s.a n.s.a n.s.a
Direction of influence 0.03 0.16 - 0.03 - 0.04 n.s.a p\ 0.05a n.s.a
Influence of the European
Union
4.31 3.66 4.42 4.83 p\ 0.001a p\ 0.001a n.s.a
Direction of influence 0.54 0.48 0.63 0.55 n.s.a n.s.a n.s.a
Perceived influence of
foreign donors
4.25 3.46 4.42 4.86 p\ 0.001a p\ 0.001a p\ 0.05a
Direction of influence 0.67 0.75 0.68 0.58 n.s.a p\ 0.05a n.s.a
Perceived influence of
corporations
2.82 3.04 2.98 2.52 n.s.a p\ 0.01a p\ 0.05a
Direction of influence 0.13 0.24 0.19 - 0.05 n.s. p\ 0.01 n.s.a
Perceived influence of
media
4.01 3.75 4.26 4.09 p\ 0.05a n.s.a n.s.a
Direction of influence 0.03 0.09 0.00 - 0.01 n.s.a n.s.a n.s.a
Perceived influence of
private philanthropists
2.79 2.76 2.95 2.71 n.s. n.s. n.s.
Direction of influence 0.59 0.72 0.64 0.42 n.s. p\ 0.001 p\ 0.05
Perceived influence of
religious institutions
3.09 3.43 3.21 2.70 p\ 0.05a p\ 0.001a n.s.a
Direction of influence - 0.03 0.18 - 0.13 - 0.18 p\ 0.05a p\ 0.001a n.s.a
aGames–Howell test result reported instead of Tukey test result to account for inhomogeneity of sample variances
Level of significance: ***p\ 0.01; **p\ 0.05; *p\ 0.1
7 All statements in this section were provided in the qualitative part
of the survey.
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religious-populist orientation and a liberal-cosmopolitan,
pro-European one.’’ This trend is not restricted to the fre-
quently cited examples of Poland and Hungary. As one
Slovenian respondent notes: ‘‘Far right groups are founding
small NGOs, calling themselves civil society. They are
louder than any other democratic groups.’’
While the process of joining the EU is widely consid-
ered a success story in this group (Fink-Hafner and Novak
2017; Freyburg and Richter 2010; Grabbe 2006), the EU’s
perceived positive influence on the institutional context has
declined since accession in 2004. Attitudes toward the
EU’s influence are also rather ambivalent, surprisingly
perhaps because, despite the declining political leverage of
EU institutions, European funding continues to be crucial
for many CSOs post-accession (Brusis 2010). However, the
allocation of funds is often firmly in the hands of local
authorities (Fink-Hafner and Novak 2017; Kuti 2017;
Szabo´ and Ma´rkus 2014), a fact also reflected in experts’
ratings of municipal governments, which they assessed
much more positively than central or regional governments
across all five countries. What is more, the bureaucratic
requirements for acquiring EU funding requires levels of
organizational capacity beyond many smaller, community-
based CSOs (Brusis 2010; Kutter and Trappmann 2010;
Strecˇansky´ 2017), as one Hungarian survey respondent
remarks: ‘‘Only the biggest NGOs are able to engage in
international activities directly financed by the European
Commission without government influence.’’
Likewise, international aid agencies and foreign donors
reduced their spending after EU accession. Now, though
they are sometimes the only significant source of funding
for advocacy work, especially that related to sensitive
topics such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and
queer (LGBTQ) rights, their influence is shrinking. This
Table 4 Expected developments (institutional actor-related categories): relative frequency per country group
Categories Percentage of experts per country group
Group 1 (CZ, HU, PL, SK,
SI) (%)
Group 2 (BG, HR,
RO) (%)
Group 3 (AL, BiH, NMK, MNE,
SRB, XK) (%)
European Union: increase in EU funding 5.3 13.9 7.5
European Union: decrease in EU funding 5.3 11.1 1.5
European Union: general positive influence of
EU integration
5.3 11.1 19.4
European Union: bureaucratization 1.3 11.1 1.5
Foreign donors: withdrawal of foreign donors 2.6 5.6 22.4
Foreign donors: decrease in funds provided by
foreign donors
5.3 8.3 19.4
Foreign donors: increase in funds provided by
foreign donors
1.3 2.8 0.0
Foreign donors: donor-driven agenda setting 0.0 0.0 10.4
Foreign donors: donor dependence 2.6 2.8 13.4
Government: increased government control of
CSOs
21.1 11.1 14.9
Government: decrease in influence on CSOs 3.9 5.6 4.5
Government: decrease of public funding 14.5 2.8 7.5
Government: increase in public funding 0.0 5.6 4.5
Government: corruption 7.9 2.8 9.0
Government: increasingly illiberalism 17.1 0.0 4.5
Government: more collaboration with civil
society
7.9 8.3 9.0
Church: decreased influence 1.3 2.8 0.0
Church: increased influence 2.6 5.6 0.0
Corporations: more collaboration with civil
society
9.2 13.9 9.0
Corporations: more private donations 20.0 13.9 7.5
Individual donors: more individual private
donations
15.8 13.9 13.4
Number of respondents by country group: Group 1, 76; Group 2, 36; Group 3, 67
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too is reflected in the expert ratings, which assess foreign
aid as more positive, but less influential than those for the
other country groups. In the case of Hungary, foreign donor
institutions have been further challenged by central gov-
ernment attempts to seize control over funding decisions
(Kuti 2017).
Given increasingly restricted access to government
funds and the decline in foreign funding, two tendencies
that are expected to continue, many CSOs face major
challenges. This feeling is articulated explicitly by one
Hungarian respondent: ‘‘CSO funding will change signifi-
cantly. Currently, most Hungarian CSOs are operating with
money received from the government, the EU and foreign
foundations. Since [such flows] have decreased and chan-
ged in the past couple of years, the CSO sector needs to
adapt and turn toward individual [sources of] funds and
corporate sponsorships, which are scarce at the moment.’’
It is hoped that private philanthropy will be boosted by the
percentage-tax rule, a provision in force in Poland, Hun-
gary, and Slovakia that allows citizens to donate 1–2% of
their income tax to eligible charitable organizations. It was
intended not only to substitute for the withdrawal of for-
eign donor funds, but also to provide a funding source
independent of government decisions (Strecˇansky´ and
To¨ro¨k 2016; To¨ro¨k 2016).
Overall, the institutional context for civil societies in the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia
has been undergoing fundamental changes over the last few
years, especially as regards the role of central governments
in CS and their attitudes toward it. After a period of
Europeanization and stabilization, CSOs are now operating
in contexts in which central governments are increasingly
becoming the ‘‘center of gravity’’ (again). This change has
coincided with increasingly hostile attitudes toward, and
limited funding for CSOs that self-identify, or are labeled
as ‘‘liberal.’’ The result has been to create expectations of
further political change, with uncertain prospects for CS,
among the experts surveyed.
Mixed Institutional Context in Bulgaria, Croatia
and Romania
The picture provided by our data for Group 2, made up of
countries who joined the EU between 2007 and 2013, is
less clear. As can be seen in Fig. 2, central governments
and the EU, which remains an important source of funding,
are evaluated as equally influential. However, while central
governments’ influence on CS is assessed negatively, that
of the EU is seen as positive. Moreover, the perceived
influence of foreign donors, which are also important
sources of funding, is rather similar to that of the EU, in
terms of both degree and direction (unlike in Group 1),
although it is expected to decline from the present high
level. In all three countries, experts report some degree of
crowding out of non-EU foreign donors, around and after
accession, which has presented new challenges for CSOs.
On the other hand, the dedicated work of CSOs and civic
activists in these countries is valued as a driver toward EU
accession, which has contributed to the creation of a
favorable legal framework for CSOs (Bezˇovan et al. 2017;
Parau 2009; Smilova 2017).
As regards EU funding, some important changes can be
observed. First, in these formerly rather centralized coun-
tries, distribution of EU funds is often the responsibility of
local authorities that were established mainly for this pur-
pose following accession (Brusis 2010; Bruszt 2008).
Accordingly, municipalities are perceived as influential
actors and funders shaping the legal and financial
Central 
government
Regional government
Municipal 
government
European Union
Corporations Media
Private philantropists
Foreign donors
Religious 
institutions
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 3 . 0 0 4 . 0 0 5 . 0 0 6 . 0 0
E
C
NE
ULF
NI
DE
VIE
C
REP
F
O
N
OIT
CE
RI
D
PERCEIVED INFLUENCE OF ACTOR ON CIVIL SOCIETY
Fig. 1 Perceived influence of
institutional forces in
government-dominated contexts
(CZ, HU, PL, SI and SK)
Voluntas
123
environment of CSOs (see also Fig. 2). Even so, their
overall direction of influence is assessed as rather neutral
because of their propensity to corruption in some countries
(e.g., Bulgaria, see Smilova 2017). Second, there is wide-
spread uncertainty about the future of EU funding for CS.
Some experts fear a decrease, whereas others hope for
increasing and reliable support. Third, to obtain EU fund-
ing CSOs require considerable administrative capabilities,
which they still have to build up, or else must come
together in alliances. As one Bulgarian respondent puts it:
‘‘CSOs are now forming alliances to get big EU projects.
This trend began in the mid-2000s, as relevant EU funding
was too big for most individual CSOs to handle.’’ Fur-
thermore, public administrations often lack the ability to
access and administer such funds. In the words of a
Croatian respondent, ‘‘calls for EU funds managed by the
central government’ ministries and agencies are announced
extremely late. The government doesn’t have enough
capacity […]. All this creates financial insecurity and often
even leads to the insolvency of CSOs.’’ This outlook pre-
sents new challenges, especially for advocacy CSOs
(Heideman 2018) and organizations concerned with
minority rights, which have traditionally been funded by
Western donor organizations (Nimu 2018).
By comparison with the two other country groups, the
media are perceived as highly influential in Group 2.
However, there are intra-group differences. Whereas in
Romania their influence is considered to be modest, but
overall positive, it is seen as strong and negative in Bul-
garia. There, press freedom indices have decreased sig-
nificantly in recent years. Many newspapers and
broadcasters are owned by relatives of an influential
politician who has been associated with organized crime
and who is believed to exert control over media content
(Smilova 2017). The Bulgarian media’s image has been
further damaged by a campaign they launched against
CSOs critical of the government and their most visible
leaders (which itself aggravated CSOs negative public
image) (Smilova 2017). A Bulgarian respondent states:
‘‘As a result of a targeted smearing media campaign against
CSOs (especially those funded by foreign donors), there is
a growing distrust in CSOs. An often voiced criticism
against activist CSOs is that they lack legitimacy—they are
not representative.’’
To sum up, the institutional context for CS in Bulgaria,
Croatia and Romania remains challenging and uncertain.
Despite the influence of the EU on policymaking and CS
policies, the heritage of a rather paternalistic state is visible
in each of these countries, for instance in poor state-CSO
relations and high levels of bureaucracy and overregulation
(Bezˇovan et al. 2017).
Foreign Actor-Dominated Context in the Western
Balkans
In the countries of Group 3, central governments are per-
ceived as less influential than the EU and foreign donor
institutions. As can be seen in Fig. 3, governments’ influ-
ence is assessed to be just as strong and negative in
absolute terms as in Group 1. However, foreign institu-
tional forces seem to constitute an important
counterweight.
That may be because none of the Western Balkan
countries has yet joined the EU, although all wish to do.
Furthermore, with the exception of Albania, they are all are
successor states of the former Socialist Republic of
Yugoslavia, and all of them were involved in the civil wars
and ethnic conflicts that followed the dissolution of
Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Therefore, the institutional con-
text of these comparatively young states is shaped by
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ongoing nation-building, ethnic tensions, and sometimes
still fragile conflict resolution processes. Most of the
countries are classified as ‘‘hybrid regimes’’ by Freedom
House’s Nations in Transit Report (Freedom House 2018),
which supports the assessment that central governments are
often ‘‘part of the problem’’ (TACSO 2014, pp. 30–31).
Their power is, however, assessed as less pronounced than
in Group 1.
By contrast, the EU is considered to be the most influ-
ential institutional actor. Furthermore, its influence is
widely perceived as positive, an assessment which can be
attributed to at least three factors. First, the EU is seen as a
source of hope and a trigger for the liberalization and
Europeanization of CS. Second, the accession process
demands that states adapt their legal frameworks to EU
requirements, which also benefits CS in general and CSOs
in particular. For instance, governments must introduce
participation rules to ensure (TACSO 2014) the involve-
ment of non-state actors in policy formulation and imple-
mentation (Kutter and Trappmann 2010), as one Albanian
respondent points out: ‘‘In recent years, government
agencies have increasingly engaged CSOs in the drafting of
sub-laws, strategies and action plans, and in the joint
implementation of projects. In the future, it is expected that
the government will increase incentives for the process of
dialogue with CSOs.’’ Third, the EU is also an important
source of funding as there are low levels of access to
individual donations or public spending. Like many other
international organizations, it channels much of its aid
through CSOs (Fagan 2011).
Similar arguments can be made for foreign donor
institutions, whose influence is perceived to be almost as
great as the EU’s and also as largely positive by the sur-
veyed experts. However, many such institutions are now
slowly withdrawing or are expected to do so in the coming
years (Vandor et al. 2017). Accordingly, their influence is
expected to decline. Our experts raised concerns about
likely replacement funding sources: ‘‘In a country of
transition, when foreign donors are leaving state institu-
tions, private organizations and private donors should jump
in. This is not happening in Serbia and I believe the CSOs
will change their goals to accommodate political elites’’
(Serbian respondent).
Despite the positive picture painted by our respondents,
foreign funding has also been subject to criticism in post-
crisis countries. Foreign donors’ activities are accused of
altering or ignoring existing CS structures and of pro-
moting ‘‘NGO-ization.’’ By this is meant the development
of Western-style project-oriented CSOs capable of meet-
ing the demands of foreign donors but not necessarily
embedded in the local community (Aksartova 2009;
Jacobsson and Saxonberg 2013; Mercer 2002). Conse-
quently, there has been criticism that such organizations
fail to engage with communities and local issues, and are
in general not overly sustainable. Moreover, EU funds are
often accessible only for a few professional CSOs which
lack local embeddedness (Fagan 2011; Pallas 2016) or are
very close to the government. As one North Macedonian
respondent remarks, the ‘‘EU is the biggest potential
donor in the Western Balkans, but their support for CS is
project based, not institutional. In countries which are EU-
candidates, some of the EU funds are funneled through
government bodies with a clear political bias toward
funding GONGOs [government-operated nongovernmen-
tal organizations], not the genuine civil society organiza-
tions.’’ These problems of donor dependency and lack of
financial sustainability are evident in the Western Balka-
ns. Domestic private philanthropists and corporations are
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still relatively unimportant and unlikely to fill the gap left
by the expected withdrawal of foreign donors, posing a
potential threat to the sustainability of many CSOs (Appe
and Pallas 2018).
Similarly, the overall political climate is challenging due
to high levels of corruption and media bias. None of the
Group 3 countries is considered to have a ‘‘free press’’
according to standard indices such as those of Reporters
Without Borders and Freedom House. The causes lie in
ownership structures, journalistic self-censorship to avoid
harassment and violence, and the lack of funding for
alternative media. Consequently, the media are often
unable to fulfill their watchdog function. Government-
friendly media outlets have even launched campaigns
against CSOs and their leaders, defaming them as ‘‘foreign
spies.’’ One Montenegrin respondent notes that ‘‘the gov-
ernment uses the media under its influence […] to destroy
the reputation of those CSOs and their leaders who criticize
the work of the government.’’ Consequently, media influ-
ence is perceived as rather strong and clearly negative (see
Fig. 3).
Generally, CSOs in the Western Balkans face many
challenges caused by the withdrawal of funding from for-
eign institutional actors that have played a major role in
shaping their contexts. For some countries, EU member-
ship is still out of reach for various reasons including the
ongoing tensions in the region and the continuing refusal of
some states to acknowledge Kosovo’s independence. The
reverberations of past crises can still be felt, and whether
CS will achieve stability is yet to be seen.
Conclusions
This study of 14 countries is the first to explore the role of
institutional forces in shaping CS in CEE. Building on
historical institutionalism, we have directed our attention
toward the role of both domestic and foreign institutional
forces, and identified patterns common to groups of
countries. In doing so, we first defined three such groups
based on the stage they have reached in the process of EU
accession since this has been and remains a juncture of
critical historical importance for CS’s development in
CEE. Survey data from experts in the various countries
corroborated this grouping and provided us with detailed
descriptions of the different institutional contexts of CS in
the three groups and the resultant challenges for CS in each
of them.
In the first group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia, and Slovenia), domestic actors—central, regional
and municipal governments—are perceived as the most
influential institutional actors, but there is no consensus on
the direction of their influence. In particular, the influence
of central governments draws criticism from many of the
experts surveyed. In contrast, the institutional environ-
ments of Group 3 countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro and
Serbia) are seen as mainly shaped by foreign forces, in
particular foreign donor organizations and the EU. The
second group (Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania) occupies an
intermediate position, with both domestic governments and
foreign institutions perceived as exercising a high degree of
influence.
These findings provide empirical evidence in favor of
using historical institutionalism as a theoretical lens. The
composition of our groups was based on historical devel-
opments, specifically the process of EU accession, and our
respondents’ assessments on the degree and direction of
institutional actors’ influence strongly supports this clus-
tering. Our analysis particularly highlights the substantial
but changing role of the EU: from a strong source of hope
and a highly important funder for CS in the pre-accession
stage, to an important external authority and supporter of
civil rights and liberties in those countries that acceded
between 2007 and 2013, to a rather marginalized institution
that is losing power under the challenge of increasingly
authoritarian national governments in the longer-standing
EU members. Our findings also show a parallel decline in
the impact of foreign donor organizations. While these
remain active in the Western Balkans, they largely termi-
nated their financial support for CS in the second and third
clusters of countries in the early 2000s and late 1990s,
respectively. At the same time, our results reinforce and
expand on earlier findings that foreign donors have some-
what ambivalent effects on CS.
Furthermore, our findings underscore the influence of
institutional environments on CS itself. In an environment
dominated by foreign actors such as that in countries
belonging to our Group 3 (and to some extent Group 2),
these may provide powerful support to CS as facilitators of
policy dialogue and funders. At the same time, though,
their influence can lead to the perception of CS as a cultural
‘‘import’’ lacking local embeddedness and legitimacy
(Fink-Hafner and Novak 2017; Spahic´-Sˇiljak 2017).
Moreover, the power exercised by foreign actors leads to
high levels of dependency, creating massive challenges for
CSOs as soon as donors reduce or terminate their com-
mitment. At the other end of the spectrum, the institutional
environment in Group 1 is characterized by strong
domestic public authorities which have moved into fill the
space left by diminishing foreign influence and legitimacy.
In this group, CSOs had earlier developed considerable size
and importance but now find themselves in a defensive
position. In Hungary and Poland in particular, CSOs are
increasingly faced not just with a reduction in access to
public funds but with open hostility from governments and
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the media; Hungarian CSOs have even been denounced as
‘‘mercenaries’’8 working for foreign foundations. It
remains to be seen whether, as our respondents hope, such
developments can be counteracted by an increase in private
philanthropy and the establishment of new, locally rooted
and community-based organizations.
Finally, while previous research often treats CS in CEE
as fairly homogenous, our findings clearly confirm the
argument of Foa and Ekiert (2017) that there is generally
no such thing as a typical ‘‘post-communist civil society.’’
We found groups of countries which have taken similar
paths but also high levels of inter-group divergence. This
suggests the need for a more finely grained framework for
international comparisons of CS than that provided by
social origins theory. Subsuming all countries of CEE
under the rubric ‘‘an interesting mix of ‘statist’ and ‘social-
democratic’ tendencies’’ (Salamon and Anheier 1998,
p. 20) does not sufficiently consider the rich variety of
institutional frameworks. As our findings show, rather than
the level of domestic public expenditure on social welfare,
foreign institutional actors including the EU, have played a
key role in determining the development of CS in the
region. Thus, we need new analytical frameworks that go
beyond intrasocietal issues to take into account the glob-
alized nature of societies, and therefore foreign institutions.
Certainly, our study has its limitations. First, the selec-
tion of respondents to the survey was based on a snowball
sampling approach (Coleman 1958). As a result, in spite of
the use of multiple starting points for sampling, we
acknowledge that our selection may be biased toward
individuals with connections to academia and private phi-
lanthropists. Next, though our survey data supports the
assumptions that the prospect of EU membership has a
strong, positive influence on CS, while accession itself
leaves CS dependent on national governments, these ideas
require further corroboration by a more detailed institu-
tional analysis. Finally, our measure of the influence of
institutional actors is rather general, being restricted to its
degree and direction as perceived by experts, and perhaps
insufficiently differentiated given the rich variety of CS
across the 14 countries.
In sum, and despite these limitations, our study con-
tributes to the literature by using a comparative analysis to
draw a much needed overall picture of the current state of
civil societies in CEE. The clustering we suggested has
proven useful in analyzing the differences and similarities
between the regions’ CSs. Moreover, our findings promote
understanding of how context shapes the trajectories of CS,
while underscoring the claim that researching the influence
of institutional contexts can provide valuable insights into
the development of CS in and beyond CEE. An analysis of
institutional environments can provide indications, and
possibly a few warning signs, as to the possible future paths
of CS in countries that have recently joined the EU or are
currently seeking entry. These insights could also be
transferred to other settings where powerful foreign actors,
such as foundations or multinational corporations, form
part of CSOs’ institutional context. Last but not least, we
hope that our research will encourage more fine-grained
comparative analyses of CS that, ideally, investigate the
role of institutional actors longitudinally.
Acknowledgements Open access funding provided by Vienna
University of Economics and Business (WU).
Funding The data collection for this study was funded in parts by
ERSTE Foundation.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of
interest.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://crea
tivecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
References
Aksartova, S. (2009). Promoting civil society or diffusing NGOs? In
D. Hammack & S. Heydemann (Eds.), Globalization, philan-
thropy, and civil society: Projecting institutional logics abroad
(pp. 160–191). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Appe, S., & Pallas, C. L. (2018). Aid reduction and local civil society:
Causes, comparisons, and consequences. VOLUNTAS: Interna-
tional Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 29(2),
245–255.
Baranowski, M., & Gross, D. A. (2006). Influence over state agency
activities: A test of two survey-based measures. State Politics
and Policy Quarterly, 6(2), 220–238.
Beichelt, T., Hahn, I., Schimmelfennig, F., & Worschech, S. (Eds.).
(2014). Civil society and democracy promotion. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Bezˇovan, G., Matancˇevic´, J., & Baturina, D. (2017). Country Report:
Croatia. In P. Vandor, N. Traxler, R. Millner, & M. Meyer
(Eds.), Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe: Challenges
and opportunities (pp. 111–125). Vienna: ERSTE Foundation.
Biernacki, P., & Waldorf, D. (1981). Snowball sampling: Problems
and techniques of chain referral sampling. Sociological Methods
and Research, 10(2), 141–163.
Bogner, A., Litting, B., & Menz, W. (2009). Expert interviews—An
introduction to a new methological debate. In A. Bogner, B.
Litting, & W. Menz (Eds.), Interviewing experts (pp. 252–273).
London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Bogner, A., & Menz, W. (2009). The theory-generating expert
interview: Epistemological interest, forms of knowledge,8 http://www.euronews.com/2018/04/12/alarm-in-hungary-over-inti
midatory-list-of-soros-mercenaries.
Voluntas
123
interaction. In A. Bogner, B. Litting, & W. Menz (Eds.),
Interviewing experts (pp. 43–80). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Boli, J., & Thomas, G. M. (1997). World culture in the world polity:
A century of international non-governmental organization.
American Sociological Review, 62(2), 171–190.
Bo¨rzel, T. A. (2010). Why you don’t always get what you want: EU
enlargement and civil society in Central and Eastern Europe.
Acta Politica, 45(1–2), 1–10.
Bo¨rzel, T. A., & Buzoga´ny, A. (2010). Governing EU accession in
transition countries. The role of non-state actors. Acta Politica,
45(1–2), 158–182.
Bo¨rzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2005). Public–private partnerships:
Effective and legitimate tools of international governance (pp.
195–216). Ontario: University of Toronto Press Toronto.
Brusis, M. (2010). European incentives and regional interest repre-
sentation in Central and Eastern European countries. Acta
Politica, 45(1/2), 70–89.
Bruszt, L. (2008). Multi-level governance—The Eastern versions:
Emerging patterns of regional developmental governance in the
new member states. Regional and Federal Studies, 18(5),
607–627.
Buzoga´ny, A. (2011). Stairway to heaven or highway to hell?
Anbivalent Europeanization and Civil Society in Central and
Eastern Europe. In H. Kouki & E. Romanos (Eds.), Protest
beyond borders. Contentious politics in Europe since 1945 (pp.
69–85). New York: Berghahn Books.
Coleman, J. (1958). Relational analysis: The study of social
organizations with survey methods. Human Organization, 17,
28–36.
Dimitrova, A., & Buzoga´ny, A. (2014). Post-accession policy-making
in Bulgaria and Romania: Can non-state actors use EU rules to
promote better governance? Journal of Common Market Studies,
52(1), 139–156.
Domaradzka, A. (2018). Urban social movements and the right to the
city: An introduction to the special issue on urban mobilization.
VOLUNTAS International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit
Organizations, 29(4), 607–620.
Drori, G. S., Meyer, J. W., & Hwang, H. (Eds.). (2006). Globalization
and organization: World society and organizational change.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Du¨r, A. (2008). Measuring interest group influence in the EU: A note
on methodology. European Union Politics, 9(4), 559–576.
Ekiert, G., & Foa, R. (2011). Civil society weakness in post-
communist Europe: A preliminary assessment. Carlo Alberto
Notebooks, 198, 1–45.
Ekiert, G., & Kubik, J. (2014). Myths and realities of civil society.
Journal of Democracy, 25(1), 46–58.
Ekiert, G., Kubik, J., & Wenzel, M. (2017a). Country Report: Poland.
In P. Vandor, N. Traxler, R. Millner, & M. Meyer (Eds.), Civil
society in central and Eastern Europe: Challenges and oppor-
tunities (pp. 76–91). Vienna: ERSTE Foundation.
Ekiert, G., Kubik, J., & Wenzel, M. (2017b). Civil society and three
dimensions of inequality in post-1989 Poland. Comparative
Politics, 49(3), 331–350.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
European Commission. (2016). European enlargement policy. Check
current status. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/
countries/check-current-status_en. Retrieved 05 February 2019.
Fagan, A. (2006). Transnational aid for civil society development in
post-socialist Europe: Democratic consolidation or a new
imperialism? The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition
Politics, 22(1), 115–134.
Fagan, A. (2011). EU assistance for civil society in Kosovo: A step
too far for democracy promotion? Democratization, 18(3),
707–730.
Fagan, A., & Wunsch, N. (2018). Fostering institutionalisation? The
impact of the EU accession process on state-civil society
relations in Serbia. Acta Politica, 45, 1–18.
Fink-Hafner, D., & Novak, M. (2017). Country Report: Slovenia. In
P. Vandor, N. Traxler, R. Millner, & M. Meyer (Eds.), Civil
Society in Central and Eastern Europe: Challenges and
opportunities (pp. 126–142). Vienna: ERSTE Foundation.
Foa, R. S., & Ekiert, G. (2017). The weakness of postcommunist civil
society reassessed. European Journal of Political Research,
56(2), 419–439.
Freedom House. (2018). Confronting illiberalism. Nations in transit
2018. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/
files/FH_NationsInTransit_Web_PDF_FINAL_2018_03_16.pdf.
Freyburg, T., & Richter, S. (2010). National identity matters: The
limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western
Balkans. Journal of European Public Policy, 17(2), 263–281.
Ganev, V. I. (2013). Post-accession hooliganism. Democratic gover-
nance in Bulgaria and Romania after 2007. East European
Politics and Societies, 27(1), 26–44.
Grabbe, H. (2006). The EU’s transformative power. Europeanization
through conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe. Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Greskovits, B. (2015). The hollowing and backsliding of democracy
in East Central Europe. Global Policy, 6, 28–37.
Heideman, L. J. (2018). Making civil society sustainable: The legacy
of USAID in croatia. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of
Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 29(2), 333–347.
Heinrich, V. F. (2005). Studying civil society across the world:
Exploring the Thorny issues of conceptualization and measure-
ment. Journal of Civil Society, 1(3), 211–228.
Heinrich, V. F. (Ed.). (2007). CIVICUS global survey of the state of
civil society, volume 1: Country profiles (Vol. 1). Bloomfield:
Kumarian Press.
Howard, M. M. (2002). The weakness of postcommunist civil society.
Journal of Democracy, 13(1), 157–169.
Howard, M. M. (2003). The weakness of civil society in post-
communist Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jacobsson, K., & Saxonberg, S. (2013). Beyond NGO-ization: The
development of social movements in Central and Eastern
Europe. London: Routledge.
Jezierska, K., & Polanska, D. V. (2018). Social movements seen as
radical political actors: The case of the Polish Tenants’
movement. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary
and Nonprofit Organizations, 29(4), 683–696.
Kabalo, P. (2013). A fifth nonprofit regime? Revisiting social origins
theory using Jewish associational life as a new state model.
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 38(4), 627–642.
Kamera¯de, D., Crotty, J., & Ljubownikow, S. (2016). Civil liberties
and volunteering in six former Soviet Union countries. Nonprofit
and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 45(6), 1150–1168.
Kendall, J., Anheier, H., & Potucek, M. (2000). Editorial: Ten years
after: The third sector and civil society in Central and Eastern
Europe. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and
Nonprofit Organizations, 11(2), 103–106.
Kerlin, J. A. (2013). Defining social enterprise across different
contexts: A conceptual framework based on institutional factors.
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 42(1), 84–108.
Kitschelt, H. (1992). Political regime change: Structure and process-
driven explanations?. New York: JSTOR.
Klayman, J., & Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1993). Thinking about the
future: A cognitive perspective. Journal of Forecasting, 12(2),
161–186.
Krippendorff, K. (2004). Reliability in content analysis: Some
common misconceptions and recommendations. Human Com-
munication Research, 30(3), 411–433.
Voluntas
123
Kuti, E´. (2017). Country Report: Hungary. In P. Vandor, N. Traxler,
R. Millner, & M. Meyer (Eds.), Civil Society in Central and
Eastern Europe: Challenges and opportunities (pp. 58–75).
Vienna: ERSTE Foundation.
Kutter, A., & Trappmann, V. (2010). Civil society in Central and
Eastern Europe: The ambivalent legacy of accession. Acta
Politica, 45(1/2), 41–69.
Lauth, H.-J. (2017). Zivilgesellschaft und die Qualita¨t der Demokra-
tie. In A. Croissant, S. Kneip, & A. Petring (Eds.), Demokratie,
Diktatur, Gerechtigkeit. Wiesbaden: Springer.
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1984). The new institutionalism:
Organizational factors in political life. American Political
Science Review, 78(3), 734–749.
Mayring, P. (2010). Qualitative inhaltsanalyse. In Handbuch quali-
tative Forschung in der Psychologie (pp. 601–613).
Mercer, C. (2002). NGOs, civil society and democratization: A
critical review of the literature. Progress in Development
Studies, 2(1), 5–22.
Merkel, W. (2010). Are dictatorships returning? Revisiting the
‘democratic rollback’hypothesis. Contemporary Politics, 16(1),
17–31.
Meuser, M., & Nagel, U. (2009). The expert interview and changes in
knowledge production. In A. Bogner, B. Litting, & W. Menz
(Eds.), Interviewing experts (pp. 17–42). London: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Meyer, J. W., Boli, J., & Thomas, G. M. (1987). Ontology and
rationalization in the western cultural account. In G. M. Thomas,
J. W. Meyer, F. O. Ramirez, & J. Boli (Eds.), Institutional
structure: Constituting state, society, and the individual (pp.
12–38). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Moore, B. J. (1966). Social origins of dictatorship and democracy:
Lords and peasant in the making of the modern world. Boston:
Beacon Press.
Navra´til, J., & Pecjal, J. (2017). Country report: Czech Republic. In P.
Vandor, N. Traxler, R. Millner, & M. Meyer (Eds.), Civil Society
in Central and Eastern Europe: Challenges and opportunities
(pp. 43–57). Vienna: ERSTE Foundation.
Nimu, A. (2018). Surviving mechanisms and strategies of gender
equality NGOs in Romania and Poland. VOLUNTAS Interna-
tional Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 29(2),
310–332.
Noutcheva, G., & Bechev, D. (2008). The successful laggards.
Bulgaria and Romania’s accession to the EU. East European
Politics and Societies, 22(1), 114–144.
Ottaway, M., & Carothers, T. (2000). Funding virtue: Civil society
aid and democracy promotion. Washington, DC: Carnegie
Endowment.
Pallas, C. L. (2016). Aid reduction and local civil society in conflict-
affected states: New research and stakeholder dialogue. Journal
of Peacebuilding & Development, 11(1), 105–109.
Parau, C. E. (2009). Impaling Dracula: How EU accession empow-
ered civil society in Romania. West European Politics, 32(1),
119–141.
Peters, B. G. (2011). Institutional theory in political science: The new
institutionalism. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing.
Piotrowski, G. (2015). What are Eastern European social movements
and how to study them? Intersections East European Journal of
Society and Politics, 1(3), 4–15.
Pop-Eleches, G., & Tucker, J. A. (2013). Associated with the past?
Communist legacies and civic participation in post-communist
countries. East European Politics and Societies, 27(1), 45–68.
Ragin, C. C. (1998). Comments on ‘‘Social origins of civil society’’.
Voluntas, 9(3), 261–270.
Ray, L. (1999). Measuring party orientations towards European
integration: Results from an expert survey. European Journal of
Political Research, 36(2), 283–306.
Reljic´, D., & und Sicherheit, I. P. (2004). Who builds civil society?
Civil society, mass media and democracy in post-communist
countries. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed
Forces (DCAF) Working paper (131).
Rikmann, E., & Keedus, L. (2013). Civil sectors in transformation
and beyond: Preliminaries for a comparison of six Central and
Eastern European Societies. VOLUNTAS: International Journal
of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 24(1), 149–166.
Ruef, M., & Scott, R. W. (1998). A multidimensional model of
organizational legitimacy: Hospital survival in changing institu-
tional environments. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43,
877–904.
Salamon, L. M., & Anheier, H. K. (1998). Social origins of civil
society: Explaining the nonprofit sector cross-nationally. Volun-
tas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organi-
zations, 9(3), 213–248.
Salamon, L. M., Anheier, H., List, R., Toepler, S., Sokolewski, W., &
Associates. (2004). Global civil society. Dimensions of the
nonprofit sector (Vol. 2). Bloomfield: Kumarian Press.
Salamon, L. M., Sokolowski, S. W., & Anheier, H. K. (2000). Social
origins of civil society: An overview. Retrieved from Baltimore.
http://ccss.jhu.edu/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/09/
CNP_WP38_2000.pdf.
Scharpf, F. W. (1997). Games real actors play. Actor-centred
institutionalism in policy research. Boulder: Westview Press.
Schimmelfennig, F., & Sedelmeier, U. (2004). Governance by
conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of
Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of European Public Policy,
11(4), 661–679.
Schmidt, V. A. (2010). Taking ideas and discourse seriously:
Explaining change through discursive institutionalism as the
fourth ‘new institutionalism’. European Political Science
Review, 2(1), 1–25.
Scott, W. R. (2000). Institutional change and healthcare organiza-
tions From professional dominance to managed care (1st ed.).
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Scott, W. R., & Meyer, J. W. (Eds.). (1994). Institutional environ-
ments and organizations. Structural complexity and individual-
ism. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Sedelmeier, U. (2014). Europe after the Eastern Enlargement of the
European Union: 2004–2014. Retrieved from https://eu.boell.
org/en/2014/06/10/europe-after-eastern-enlargement-european-
union-2004-2014.
Sedelmeier, U. (2017). Political safeguards against democratic
backsliding in the EU. The limits of material sanctions and the
scope of social pressure. Journal of European Public Policy,
24(3), 337–351.
Shapovalova, N., & Youngs, R. (2014). The changing nature of EU
support to civil society. In T. Beichelt, I. Hahn, F. Schim-
melfennig, & S. Worschech (Eds.), Civil society and democracy
promotion (pp. 86–109). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Skocpol, T. (1973). A critical review of Barrington Moore’s social
origins of dictatorship and democracy. Politics and Society, 4(1),
1–34.
Skocpol, T., & Somers, M. (1980). The uses of comparative history in
macrosocial inquiry. Comparative Studies in Society and
History, 22(2), 174–197.
Smets, M., Morris, T., & Greenwood, R. (2012). From practice to
field: A multilevel model of practice-driven institutional change.
Academy of Management Journal, 55(4), 877–904.
Smilova, R. (2017). Country Report: Bulgaria. In P. Vandor, N.
Traxler, R. Millner, & M. Meyer (Eds.), Civil Society in Central
and Eastern Europe: Challenges and opportunities (pp.
125–143). Vienna: ERSTE Foundation.
Smith, S. R., & Grønbjerg, K. A. (2006). Scope and theory of
government-nonprofit relations. In W. W. Powell & R. Steinberg
Voluntas
123
(Eds.), The nonprofit sector: A research handbook (Vol. 2,
pp. 221–242). London: Yale University Press.
Spahic´-Sˇiljak, Z. (2017). Country Report: Bosnia and Herzegovina. In
P. Vandor, N. Traxler, R. Millner, & M. Meyer (Eds.), Civil
Society in Central and Eastern Europe: Challenges and
opportunities (pp. 188–203). Vienna: ERSTE Foundation.
Steinberg, R., & Young, D. R. (1998). A comment on Salamon and
Anheier’s ‘‘Social origins of civil society’’. Voluntas: Interna-
tional Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 9(3),
249–260.
Stemler, S. (2001). An overview of content analysis. Practical
Assessment, Research and Evaluation, 7(17), 137–146.
Strecˇansky´, B. (2017). Country report: Slovakia. In P. Vandor, N.
Traxler, R. Millner, & M. Meyer (Eds.), Civil Society in Central
and Eastern Europe: Challenges and opportunities (pp. 92–110).
Vienna: ERSTE Foundation.
Strecˇansky´, B., & To¨ro¨k, M. (Eds.). (2016). Assessment of the impact
of the percentage tax designations: Past, present, future. Vienna:
ERSTE Foundation and Centrum Pre Filantropiu.
Szabo´, M. & Ma´rkus, E. (2014). Civil society in Hungary. 25 years
after. In Schreier (Ed.), Civil Society in the ‘Visegra´d Four’—
Data and Literature in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland
and Slovakia. Berlin: Maecenata Institut fu¨r Philantropie und
Zivilgesellschaft,(Vol. Opusculum Nr 74) (pp. 94–129).
TACSO. (2014). Civil society organizations in Bosnia and Herze-
govina: Needs Assessment Report. Technical Assistance for Civil
Society Organisations.
Taylor, M. (2000). Media relations in Bosnia: A role for public
relations in building civil society. Public Relations Review,
26(1), 1–14.
Thelen, K. (1999). Historical institutionalism in comparative politics.
Annual Review of Political Science, 2(1), 369–404.
Tilly, C. (1984). Big structures, large processes, huge comparisons.
Russell: Sage.
Titanski-Hooper, J. (2015). (B)ordering in the EU: Croatia’s Path
Toward Becoming ‘European’. In N. Pasamitros, T. Phillips, N.
Rossis, & T. Koszadinova (Eds.), An Agenda for Western
Balkans: From Elite Politics to Social Sustainability (pp.
34–43). Stuttgart: Ibidem.
Toepler, S., & Salamon, L. M. (2003). NGO development in Central
and Eastern Europe: An empirical overview. East European
Quarterly, 37(3), 365–378.
Tolbert, P. S. (1985). Institutional environments and resource
dependence: Sources of administrative structure in institutions
of higher education. Administrative Science Quarterly, 30(1),
1–13.
To¨ro¨k, M. (2016). Policy making. In B. T. M. Strecˇansky´ (Ed.),
Assessment of the impact of the percentage tax designations:
Past, present, future. Vienna: ERSTE Foundation and Centrum
Pre Filantropiu.
USAID. (2018). The 2017 CSO sustainability index for central and
Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Retrieved from: https://www.usaid.
gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/CSOSI_EE_2017_Regio
nal_Report_FINAL_2.pdf.
Vandor, P., Traxler, N., Millner, R., & Meyer, M. (2017). Civil
society in Central and Eastern Europe: Challenges and oppor-
tunities. Vienna: Erste Stiftung.
Wunsch, N. (2016). Coming full circle? Differential empowerment in
Croatia’s EU accession process. Journal of European Public
Policy, 23(8), 1199–1217.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to
jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Voluntas
123
